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Abstract 
 
GOLD (Grid-based Information Models to Support the Rapid Innovation of New 
High Value-Added Chemicals) is concerned with the dynamic formation and 
management of virtual organizations in order to exploit market opportunities. The 
project aims to deliver the enabling technology to support the creation, operation and 
successful dissolution of such virtual organizations. A set of middleware technologies 
has been designed and being implemented to address issues such as trust, security, 
contract management and monitoring, information management, etc. for virtual 
collaboration between companies. In this paper we discuss some of the more general 
requirements for authentication and authorization aspects in GOLD virtual 
organizations and we use these requirements as benchmark to assess some of the 
more popular tools that are currently available in dealing with these issues, together 
with our own approach that addresses these problems. 
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Abstract. GOLD (Grid-based Information Models to Support the Rapid 
Innovation of New High Value-Added Chemicals) is concerned with the 
dynamic formation and management of virtual organizations in order to exploit 
market opportunities. The project aims to deliver the enabling technology to 
support the creation, operation and successful dissolution of such virtual 
organizations. A set of middleware technologies has been designed and being 
implemented to address issues such as trust, security, contract management and 
monitoring, information management, etc. for virtual collaboration between 
companies. In this paper we discuss some of the more general requirements for 
authentication and authorization aspects in GOLD virtual organizations and we 
use these requirements as benchmark to assess some of the more popular tools 
that are currently available in dealing with these issues, together with our own 
approach that addresses these problems.  
1 Introduction 
Authentication and authorization mechanisms are integral to the operation of any 
virtual organization. The GOLD project spent a considerable amount of time and 
effort gathering a full set of requirements [Periorellis P. et al 2004] that address the 
needs of virtual organizations in terms of such mechanisms. We have identified a 
need for flexible, interoperable solutions that are capable of dealing with the cross-
organisational nature of VOs as well as its dynamics in terms of composition. The 
tools that we discuss in this paper are open source solutions that are popular amongst 
the e-Science community. We attempt to evaluate those against a set of requirements 
that we present in the next section. The paper is structured as follows. In the next 
section we discuss general requirements for authentication and authorization in VOs. 
We move on to present 4 tools frameworks which we assess against our requirements 
section. Section 4 presents on a comparative evaluation between the tools.  
2 Requirements  
Virtual organizations bring together a number of autonomic organizations to assess a 
market opportunity. The duration of this collaboration can be brief or require a larger 
life span. It is certain that during the lifetime of a VO, the parties that form it will be 
required to share resources. Hence access of those resources will require crossing of 
organizational boundaries. Participants of a VO are expected to have implemented 
their own security mechanisms to protect resources within their boundaries by some 
authentication mechanisms. A participant may require access to several resources 
scattered across several organizational boundaries. Hence the problem that is created 
is that of multiple logins. Obviously expecting a party to login several times in order 
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to carry out a task that is part of the same activity is not productive. The way we solve 
this problem is by providing 3rd trusted parties that provide security assertions as and 
when needed. These 3rd trusted parties authenticate VO participants and whenever a 
party requires remote access they vouch for that party’s identity usually by sending a 
signed credential token. Examples of these are the Microsoft passport which offers a 
central ID provision and management. 
 
Another solution is that of federation, which is supported by the Liberty Alliance 
Group. In this case parties agree on pre-determined trust relations between services 
providers and identity providers. Blum D. [2005] defines federation as a community 
of organizations or domains that use collective terms describing agreements, 
standards and technologies that make identity portable across autonomous domains. 
Federation although offers a conceptual solution to the issue of multiple logins, is not 
always possible to adopt. The main problem that arises within a commercial context is 
that of parties disagreeing on the authorities they trust. Federation requires that 
assertions made by entities within a trust circle are accepted, i.e. they should be 
trusted. In the domain that we have been looking at [Conlin et al. 2005] this is not 
always the case. We therefore need to allow parties that form the VO to have the 
option of validating an assertion by entities that may not directly be linked with a VO. 
As such we cannot impose authorities that everyone within a VO must trust. Instead 
we need to provide the underlying protocols that allow participants of a VO to 
validate security related assertions by authorities which individual entities trust. 
 
Regarding authorization, given the dynamicity of VOs, both the topology of the VO 
(parties that form it and links between them) and its workflow are subject to change. 
Therefore static rights assignment prior to a workflow does not capture the eventuality 
of a party leaving the VO or being added. In addition given the sensitivity of the 
information that may be shared in some VOs (which raises concerns regarding 
competitive advantage) parties are not expected to be handed permission that last 
throughout the duration of a VO. It is more likely that companies will agree limited 
access or gradual access to their resources depending on progress. In GOLD we want 
to be able to restrict role access on resources depending on the execution context. In a 
virtual organization the execution context can be regarded as the particular project or 
the goal that all participants have come together to achieve. In a virtual organization 
there can be many projects with various participants resulting to complicated 
interrelationships between them. For example, some of them may play the same role 
in various projects, carrying out the exact same tasks, or have different roles within 
the same project depending on the performed task. The question we raise is ‘Should a 
role have the same permission and access rights throughout the set of similar or even 
identical projects and the tasks within those projects?’ Our view is that in dynamic 
access control systems we should separate roles from role instances. Different role 
instances may require different permissions and indeed additional levels of 
authorization depending on the project and task in which they are active. 
 
The main GOLD case study involves the collaboration of a number of companies to 
enable the development of chemicals. The domain itself requires the sharing of 
sensitive information between participants who may have conflicting interests. In 
order to raise the levels of trust within such a VO we need to make sure that we have 
developed fine grained access control mechanisms. RBAC or other traditional 
techniques do not provide this level of granularity. The main issues regarding access 
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control relate to the degree of granularity embedded in the controlling mechanism 
itself. By granularity we refer to the level of detail for which we are prepared to 
define access rights. In GOLD, the simple subject-object permissions model on which 
RBAC is based is not sufficient. We need fine grained permissions for instances of 
roles as well as instances of objects. For example, a chemist role may be granted 
access to chemical documents but we do not however wish to grant access to all 
chemical documents produced by the system. Instead, we want any access 
permissions granted to the chemist role to be project-specific (e.g., the instance of a 
particular collaboration) as well as task-specific (e.g., the instance of a particular pre-
defined activity). The management of roles and access permissions in GOLD is 
integrated with the management and monitoring of dynamic service level agreement 
or contracts between the participating services. The contracts can capture the 
expectations from specific tasks, using pre- and post-conditions. Permissions for roles 
can be activated and deactivated based on the progress of the monitored contracts. 
 
Given the plethora of policies for access control within a VO in conjunction with the 
fact that there is not a single authority that governs these policies (the majority will 
stem from participants’ requirements on how they want to protect their resource) 
validation will be needed to make sure that there are no logical inconsistencies prior 
to the workflow enactment. Finally policies would also need to be verified against 
industrial regulations that govern a particular sector such that of chemical 
development. Therefore policies should comply with the higher more abstract 
industry policies on how chemical development should be conducted. 
 
We need an authorization-authentication framework that allows single sign on to be 
achieved by various methods without imposing any decisions regarding who the 
trusted parties should be to the VO participants. It should support federations but at 
the same time it should provide flexible protocols that allow participants to validate 
security assertions using authorities that those parties trust. 
 
The framework must enable VO to define conceptual boundaries around projects and 
tasks so that the roles and permissions can be scoped. Since a VO is comprised from a 
set of services, messages between those services need to propagate context-related 
information that can be used to identify the specific scope in which the security-
related decisions can be made. Services can use the context information to determine 
whether the requestor has sufficient permission to perform operations or access 
resources. Other levels of requestor verification, such as authentication, could be 
implemented using existing methods (e.g. certificate-based authentication) and RBAC 
using access lists associated with each role. The framework must allow for the 
dynamic activation and deactivation of permissions and roles based on progress 
monitoring of projects and tasks based on established contracts. For example, if a role 
fails to deliver its obligations within a task, we may want to deactivate certain 
permissions to that role. Also, if a task is completed successfully, we may want to add 
more permission to a particular role so that resources and actions in a following task 
become accessible. In essence, the effective permissions are linked with the scope of 
the activity being performed. 
3 Tools and Evaluation 
Section 3 introduces 4 tools that target similar issues of authentication and 
authorization. These tools are PERMIS, OASIS, Shibboleth, XACML. We present 
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these tools and their features individually in this section. The following section 
(Section 4) provides a detailed evaluation of these tools in conjunction with our 
requirements. 
 
3.1 PERMIS – PrivilEge and Role Management Infrastructure 
Standards Validation 
PERMIS was funded by Information Society Initiative in Standardization and 
developed by Salford University. PERMIS dictates a typical role based access control 
model and aims to provide a solution for managing user credentials when accessing 
target resources. It is used in electronic transactions in governments, universities or 
businesses for solving the “authentication of the personal identity of the parties 
involved” and the “determination of the roles, status, privileges, or other socio-
economic attributes” [PERMIS 2001] of the individual, through the use of X.509 
attribute certificates (ACs). In PERMIS, the X.509 attribute certificates (ACs) are 
widely used to store users’ roles and XML-based authorization policies for access 
control decisions. Attribute certificates are digitally signed by the issuers and stored in 
the public repositories.  
 
Chadwick & Otenko [2003_1] has summarized basic features of PERMIS. He claims 
that PERMIS is a mechanism for identifying users, which are entities that can be 
authorized to perform actions; a language for specifying application “policies”, which 
govern the actions that users are authorized to perform; a “compliance checker”, 
which provides a service to applications for determining how an action requested by 
users should be handled, given a policy and a set of credentials.  PERMIS also 
provides a Privilege Management Infrastructure (PMI) that is used to characterize an 
authorization context, while Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is typically associated 
with authentication.  
 
PERMIS makes access control decisions based on policies, which provide the means 
to authorize the actions that users are allowed to perform. A policy is usually created 
to define the rules for assigning roles to users, and permissions to roles. Each 
PERMIS policy is assigned with a unique number. Policies are then digitally signed 
by the Source of Authority (SOA, the root of rust) of the security domain and stored 
as policy ACs in the public repositories by which SOA is trusted. When PERMIS 
system is started up, the location of the public repository and the unique number of 
policy are identified to specify which policy/policies to use. PERMIS reads in all the 
policy ACs from the repository and checks signatures. Once signatures are valid it 
uses the policy with the correct number. Thus policy is a predominant factor that 
makes a granted or denied decision on the user’s request.    
 
There are a few unique concepts in PERMIS which are also illustrated in the Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. PERMIS Architecture (source from Bacon J. et al. [2003]) 
 
3.1.1 Attribute Certificates (ACs) and LDAP directory 
PERMIS uses X.509 attribute certificates to store roles for users and policies. They 
are the key actor of the PERMIS role-based access control system. The role ACs act 
as storages of roles which have been assigned to users, while policy ACs act as 
storages for policies. In particular each role AC contains the X.500 distinguished 
name of the user, the attributes allocated to the user, and validity period of the 
certificate, etc. The ACs are digitally signed by the issuer. Integrity and authenticity 
of the attribute certificates are protected by the digital signatures, so roles and policies 
cannot be tampered with. PERMIS makes use of public repository which by default is 
the LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol) directory. LDAP is a popular 
Internet standard for accessing repositories. In PERMIS, the LDAP directory forms a 
repository where attribute certificates introduced above are stored. Every LDAP 
directory has a globally unique distinguished name.   
 
3.1.2 AEF and ADF  
The architecture of PERMIS involves two major components: a decision enforcement 
point (equivalent to PEP in XACML term) Access Control Enforcement Function 
(AEF) and a decision making point (equivalent to PDP in XACML term) Access 
Control Decision Function (ADF) as shown in the Figure 1. The AEF is application 
specific while ADF is application independent. In a security domain, there is one 
ADF which makes all the access control decisions for user requests. AEF is 
application specific so multiple AEF instances can exist in a domain that act as 
decision enforcement points for individual requests. The application independent 
feature of ADF ensures the consistency of access control decisions enforcement. To 
maintain the consistency and independence of decision making process, PERMIS has 
defined its own policy grammar to support such architecture [Bacon et al, 2003]. The 
PERMIS PMI API in the Figure 1, links the AEF and ADF. The API provides 
methods for getting credentials from AEF once user requests have been made, making 
access control decisions, etc and a constructor for constructing PERMIS API java 
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objects. The API activates the ADF to read in the policy and role ACs from 
repositories and checks the signature and the policy consistencies.  
 
3.1.3 Application Gateway 
An Application Gateway is a generic term used to define a PERMIS access control 
engine to control user access to resources. As shown in Figure 1, the Application 
Gateway comprises the components of ADF, AEF and the API linking the two 
functions as illustrated above. It acts as the connection between requests and LDAP 
repositories. 
 
When the PERMIS system starts, appropriate policies are fetched from the LDAP 
repository. When a user’s request which contains user name, action name, target 
name has been made, the ADF can retrieve the user’s role ACs, if there are any, from 
the LDAP to identify what roles the user possesses by knowing the user name passed 
from AEF. Once ther user has been proved to have a correct role and the user’s 
original request, e.g. a request to a document, complies with what the policies dictate, 
access is granted. In other case access can be denied, e.g. user doesn’t have any role 
ACs in the LDAP; user has an AC, but issued by someone not identified by the 
fetched policies; user has an AC, but the role in the AC is not permitted to do the right 
action as dictated by the fetched policies, etc.    
 
As indicated, PERMIS makes access control decisions are based on policies for which 
PERMIS defines its own policy grammar. Typically the PERMIS XML Policy 
comprises the following components [Bacon et al 2003], [Chadwick & Otenko 
2003_2], [Chadwick & Otenko 2003_1]:  
a. The unique policy object identifiers to identify different policies. 
b. The Subject Domains to indicate the subjects who can assert roles.  
c. The Role Hierarchy policy to list the roles and their hierarchical relationships. 
d. The SOA policy to list the trusted SOAs (Source of Authority). 
e. The Role Assignment policy to say which SOAs are trusted to issue which 
roles to which subject domains. 
f. The Target Domains to list the target services governed by this policy. 
g. The Action policy to list the allowed actions. 
h. The Target Access Policy to specify the set of roles/attributes required to 
perform a particular action on a particular target and any other conditions. 
 
In summary, PERMIS is a role based access control system, which bases all the 
access control decisions on the roles for users and policies. Roles and policies are 
respectively stored in X.509 attribute certificates, which are then protected by digital 
signature and kept in the public repository-LDAP directory. In the PERMIS 
architecture, a user makes access request via an application gateway. In the 
application gateway the enforcement point AEF authenticates the user and asks the 
decision making point ADF if the user is permitted to perform the requested action on 
the target service provider. The ADF accesses LDAP directories to retrieve the policy 
and role attribute certificates, then makes a granted or denied decision.  
 
 
 
 
6
3.2 OASIS - An Open, role-based, Access control architecture 
for Secure Interworking Services 
OASIS is developed by Opera research group in Cambridge Computer Lab [OASIS 
2003] and is a role based access control system for open, interworking services in a 
distributed environment, with services being grouped into domains for the purpose of 
management. The aim of OASIS is to provide a standard mechanism for users and 
services in a distributed environment to interwork securely with access control 
policies enforced. OASIS system is based on Role Membership Certificates (RMC) 
issued to the users and Credential Records (CR) stored on the servers. One focus of 
OASIS is the dynamic role activation. For example, in order for a user to possess a 
role, there may be a set of role activation conditions must be satisfied. These 
conditions may include requirements for prerequisite roles, and any other constraints. 
Roles can be activated or deactivated dynamically as situations arise. OASIS uses 
appointment certificates for associating privileges persistently with membership of 
some roles. These certificates can be issued to users from some roles with the 
particular functions and they can serve as a form of credential to satisfy the role 
activation conditions for a user to activate one or more other  roles.  
    
Some other key differences are summarized by Bacon et al [2003] between OASIS 
and other typical role-based access control schemes (Sandhu R. et al [1996] proposed 
a number of RBAC models, i.e. Base Model, Role Hierarchies, Constraints Model, 
Consolidated Model). Roles in OASIS are service-specific and there is no globally 
centralized administration of role name and privilege management. Services have 
their own controls on the role assignments and this makes it easier to define roles or 
create policies for each service independently. Roles are activated within sessions 
where an OASIS session is started by strong authentication of a user. All privileges 
are associated with roles.  
 
OASIS therefore introduces a few new concepts in comparison with its counterparts. 
These are discussed in association with Figure 2, OASIS Service Architecture in a 
single service.  
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Figure 2. OASIS Service Architecture (in a single service) (source from Bacon J. et 
al. [2003])  
 
 
 
3.2.1 Appointment and appointment certificates 
An important notion OASIS has introduced is that of appointment which was briefly 
mentioned earlier, to support the management of OASIS privileges. This is a 
technique to allocate privileges persistently to users. The capabilities specified in the 
privileges that users possess are kept in the appointment certificate, which is also a 
key concept in OASIS. This appointment system dictates that in OASIS, being active 
in certain roles gives the user authority to issue appointment certificates to other users. 
Such active roles possess a unique function to issue the certificates. Appointment 
certificates themselves convey no privileges but may be required as credentials, 
alongside environmental constraints and prerequisite roles, as evidence to activate 
other roles. Hence the role activation conditions in OASIS may include appointment 
certificates. The adoption of appointment certificates forms the key factor in dynamic 
role activation in distributed environments.   
 
3.2.2 Dynamic Role Activation and Role Activation Policy (RAP) 
OASIS centers on dynamic role activation which is already discussed above. The 
dynamic role activation emphasis on the relationships or dependencies between roles 
and allows services to specify a number of role activation rules or role activation 
conditions in order for role activations to take place. For example, to activate a certain 
role in a service, some prerequisite roles may be specified that the user must have 
activated beforehand. The prerequisite roles can be from the service the user wants to 
access or from other services. Also there can be environmental constraints on role 
activation. The examples of environmental constraints can be specific time 
requirements for a role to be activated, or a specific database that must be consulted to 
take some action. Active security environments in OASIS allows roles to be activated 
or deactivated once conditions change, thus particular role activation conditions must 
remain satisfied for a user to remain active in a role. As discussed, appointment 
certificates can also serve as determinants to satisfy the role activation conditions. 
Role Activation Policy acts as storages from which the role activation service 
retrieves role activation conditions, as shown in Figure 2. 
 
3.2.3 Role Membership Certificate (RMC) and Credential Record 
(CR) 
In dynamic role activation, once all the rules or conditions are satisfied, a role 
membership certificate (RMC) can be issued to the user. When this is issued the 
user’s role is activated. In the meantime, a new credential record (CR) is set up by the 
target service to record the status of the role that has been activated. As seen in Figure 
2, the steps 1 and 2 describe that once the credentials are provided by the user and all 
the role activation rules are satisfied by consulting the Role Activation Policy (RAP) 
component, a RMC is subsequently issued to the user. Also the RAP notifies the CR 
of the role activation and RMC issuing statuses. Once the step 3 service is invoked, 
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CR also acts as a validation point where RMC sent by the user can be validated to 
prove all the conditions have been satisfied. 
 
However, Bacon J. et al [2003] also points that such kind of functionality is not 
practically possessed by every service. In a larger scale application, it is expected that 
each administrative domain has a unique service that does all the above 
functionalities, i.e. role activation, RMC issuing and RMC validation, on behalf of all 
the services in the domain. There is one component as a separate service taking on the 
same tasks for the entire domain.  
 
In summary, OASIS is a role based access control architecture for achieving secure 
interoperation of services in an open and distributed environment. Services have 
independent rights to define roles and specify rules for role activation. Users must 
submit required credentials and satisfy various conditions in order to activate a role to 
access a service. Roles are activated dynamically in the sessions and can be 
deactivated at any time once the conditions are no longer satisfied. Appointment 
certificates are used to handle delegation of rights between users. An appointment 
certificate can be a part of role activation conditions.   
 
3.3 Shibboleth – Federated Identity 
Shibboleth is a project developed at Internet2/MACE [Internet2/MACE 1996-2005]. 
Shibboleth is an identity management (user attributes based) system designed to 
provide federated identity and aims to meet the needs of the higher education and 
research communities to share secured online services and access restricted digital 
content. It focuses on providing a way for a user using a web browser to be authorized 
to access a target site using information held at the user’s security domain. It also 
aims to allow users to access controlled information securely from anywhere without 
the need of additional authentication process.  “Shibboleth is developing architectures, 
policy structures, practical technologies and an open source implementation to 
support inter-institutional sharing of web resources subject to access control” 
[Shibboleth 2005].   
 
The design of Shibboleth was based on a few key concepts: 
a. Federated Administration. The browser user’s home security domain, i.e. 
user’s origin campus in the higher education context provides attribute assertions 
about the user to the target site, i.e. target campus in the higher education context. A 
trust fabric already exists between the two campuses, allowing each site to identify the 
other, and assign a trust level. The origin campus sites are responsible for 
authenticating their users. 
b. Access Control Based On Attributes. Access control decisions are made using 
those attribute assertions. The collection of assertions might include identity. 
c. Active Management of Privacy. The origin site, i.e. the home security domain, 
and the browser user, control what information is released to the target site. Users can 
manage attribute release via a web based interface without control from target site. 
d. Standards Based. Shibboleth uses OpenSAML [OpenSAML 2005] for the 
message and assertion formats, and protocol bindings which are based on Security 
Assertion Markup Language (SAML).  
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e. A Framework for Multiple, Scaleable Trust and Policy Sets (Federations). 
Shibboleth uses federation to specify a set of parties who have agreed to a common 
set of policies. 
f. Shibboleth has defined a standard set of attributes. 
 
   
3.3.1 Identity Provider (IdP) and Service Provider (SP) 
Shibboleth system includes two main components: Identity Provider (IdP) and Service 
Provider (SP) [Shibboleth 2005, Vullings et al 2005, Morgan et al 2004, Scavo & 
Cantor 2005, Pinto & Fernau 2005], (See Figure 3, Shibboleth Architecture). Identity 
Provider is associated with the origin site, which is the home security domain to the 
browser users. Service Provider is associated with the target site. These two 
components are usually deployed separately but they work together to provide secure 
access to web based resource.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Shibboleth Architecture (source from Pinto F. & Fernau C. [2005]) 
 
3.3.2 Federation 
Vullings et al [2005] points that the main assumption underlying Shibboleth is that the 
IdP and the SP trust each other within a federation. This means that all the IdPs know 
all the trusted SPs in a federation and vice versa, and this trust is based on Public Key 
Infrastructure and managed using PKI certificates. Therefore Shibboleth assumes 3 
entities in general, i.e. user, service provider site, and user’s home organization. The 
user logs on to the service provider site, and the service provider asks for user identity 
related information.  
 
Hence the key concept in Shibboleth is Federation, or Federated Identity, i.e. the 
federated trust between IdP and SP. Some main features of this federation activated 
system are summarized by Morgan et al [2004]. He claims that federation supports 
secure user access to Web-based resources; enables independent organizations to 
federate to extend the capabilities of their existing identity-management services; 
supports multi-organizational federations to enable scalable use of the technology; 
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encourages attribute-based authorization; provides controls to protect the privacy of 
personal information. 
 
3.3.3 Shibboleth Architecture 
Figure 3 describes the architecture on which Shibboleth is based. The following 
illustration is based on a sample scenario in the higher education context. When a user 
accesses a resource for the first time, the SP needs to identify the higher education 
institution where the user belongs, which is then used to authenticate the user via 
Authentication Authority in IdP, and later on, during the authorization phase, to 
obtain attributes from Authorization Authority in IdP. Shibboleth also uses an 
optional Where Are You From (WAYF) service, to ask the users about the institution 
they belong to.  The WAYF service is essentially a “navigation” page, which presents 
the user with a list of the trusted organizations whose users may access the resource.  
The user then selects his home organization which is running the Shibboleth IdP 
software.  The user enters into the home organization site and is then authenticated by 
the IdP, and the IdP issues an assertion to vouch for the user’s valid identity, and 
sends the assertion over to the SP, as a proof to the SP that the user has been 
genuinely authenticated. The user is therefore directed back to the resource for the 
access, by taking advantage of the already established trust relation between IdP and 
SP. In the meantime the SP on the resource site validates the assertion and can request 
other information, e.g. user’s particular attributes, during the authorization phase. 
Shibboleth introduces attribute-based authorization [Morgan et al, 2004] that 
additional information about users can be requested by applications as part of the 
authorization processes. 
 
3.3.4 SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language) 
The implementation of the Shibboleth system and the assertion that IdP issues, are 
based on and conformant to the SAML standard version 1.1, i.e. Security Assertion 
Markup Language standard. The most updated version of SAML standard is 2.0 and 
is also supported by OASIS Security Service [2005] and the Liberty Alliance [2004]. 
SAML 2.0 provides support for full federation and mapping of identifiers, session 
management, greater interoperability for attribute exchange and other features 
[Vullings et al 2005]. Shibboleth is implemented on the OpenSAML [2005] APIs, 
while OpenSAML (version 1.1) is a set of open source Java and C++ libraries that 
implement the SAML 1.0 and 1.1 specifications. The typical sample use case of 
SAML is SSO (Single Sign-On) mechanism, which allows a user to be able to sign on 
only once at one access point among a group of trusted sites. SSO is enabled in the 
federation and in the Shibboleth. 
 
Overall, Shibboleth is an identity management system with authentication and 
authorization enabled. It aims to exchange user attributes securely across domains for 
authorization purpose and Public Key Infrastructure is the foundation to build the 
predetermined trust relation between Shibboleth components, i.e. Identity Providers 
and Service Providers, of the federated members. The key concept in Shibboleth is 
that federation and federated identities for authentication.  Shibboleth uses 
OpenSAML APIs to standardize message and assertion formats, and bases protocol 
bindings on SAML.  
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3.4 XACML – eXtensible Access Control Mark-up Language 
XACML is an XML based Web service standard for communicating access control 
policies between services. It provides standard XML schema for expressing policies, 
rules based on those policies and conditions. It also specifies a request/response 
protocol for sending a request and having it approved. The request/response language 
expresses queries about whether a particular access should be allowed (requests) and 
describes answers to those queries (responses) [SUNXACML 2004]. Policies are 
defined in terms of subjects, (i.e. users, machines, services etc) and resources 
(documents, machines etc). Both subjects and resources are identified using URIs. 
The total number of subjects and resources together, define what XACML 
specification terms as the target space. The Specification defines a simple scenario 
which we quote in order to explain XACML. In a typical XACML usage scenario, a 
subject (e.g. human user, workstation) wants to take some action on a particular 
resource. The subject submits its query to the entity protecting the resource (e.g. 
filesystem, web server).” [SUNXACML 2004] 
3.4.1 PEP (Policy Enforcement Point) and PDP (Policy Decision 
Point) 
In the specification such an entity is called a PEP (Policy Enforcement Point). A PEP 
can be thought of as a piece of code that translates the request in the XML format that 
XACML specifies. 
“The PEP forms a request (using the XACML request language) based on the 
attributes of the subject, action, resource, and other relevant information. The PEP 
then sends this request to a Policy Decision Point (PDP), which examines the request, 
retrieves policies (written in the XACML policy language) that are applicable to this 
request, and determines whether access should be granted according to the XACML 
rules for evaluating policies.” [SUNXACML 2004] 
Figure 4 depicts how XACML works based on the components of PEP, PDP. In the 
Sunxacml [2004] API the PDP is piece of software that reads both requests in XML 
format (as standardized by XACML) and XACML policies, and formulates an XML 
response. Actually the entire API is about the PDP as the other architectural 
components such as the PEP are domain specific. That answer (expressed in the 
XACML response language) is returned to the PEP, which can then allow or deny 
access to the requester.” [SUNXACML 2004]. XACML does not make decisions; it 
merely gives a response according to the policy input it receives. The response is not 
forced. So additional programming is needed to actually read the response from the 
PDP (by parsing the xml) and force the policy. 
3.4.2 Benefits 
The benefits of the XACML as written in the specification are as follows 
[SUNXACML 2004]: 
a. One standard access control policy language can replace dozens of 
application-specific languages; 
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b. Administrators don’t need to rewrite their policies in many different 
languages; 
c. Developers don’t have to invent new policy languages and write code to 
support them. They can reuse existing code; 
d. Good tools for writing and managing XACML policies will be developed, 
since they can be used with many applications; 
e. XACML is flexible to accommodate most access control policy needs and 
extensible so that new requirements can be supported; 
f. One XACML policy can cover many resources. This helps avoid inconsistent 
policies on different resources; 
g. XACML allows one policy to refer to another. 
Request Entry
Point
Policy, 
Decision Point
Policy 
Enforcement 
Point
Policy, 
Storage Point P
P
Request
1.0
XACML 
Request
2.0
XML 
Policies
2.0
XACML 
Response
3.0
Decision
4.0
 
Figure 4. XACML Architecture 
Overall, XACML is a standardized language in XML to express authorization policies 
or rules within policies, as well as a request/response protocol for sending a request 
and asking for allowed or denied permissions.  XACML allows fine-grained access 
control and is based on the assumption that a user’s request to perform an action on a 
resource under certain conditions needs an “allow” or “deny” decision. The main 
components in XACML are Policy Enforcement Point and Policy Decision Point.  
4 Discussion 
The requirements section of this paper describes how virtual organization dynamics 
can affect decisions regarding the implementation of authentication and authorization 
mechanisms. The requirements we addressed in GOLD form the benchmark against 
which other tools are evaluated. The Table 1 (Evaluation of tools) gives an overview 
on these requirements and how other tools tackle these problems.  
 
4.1 Authentication and Single Sign On (SSO) 
On the authentication front, the key issue is single-sign-on. Thus a single action of 
authentication can permit a user to access all the resources as long as some access 
control policy permits it, without the need to transfer identity credentials multiple 
times on different sites. Such a mechanism can also minimize possible authentication 
errors, inconsistencies, and authentication system failures in a trust domain. The 
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GOLD system supports SSO via the usage of SAML assertions and related protocols 
as specified by Liberty Alliance [2003], using OpenSAML [2005] APIs. 
 
PERMIS offers a RBAC authorization infrastructure. However, PERMIS has been 
built to be authentication agnostic [Bacon et al 2003]. When a user wishes to access 
an application controlled by PERMIS, the user must first be authenticated by the 
application specific AEF, i.e. Access Control Enforcement Function. OASIS does not 
have support for authentication. It is entirely an access control system. Shibboleth 
implements the single-sign-on mechanism via the use of SAML and the concept of 
federated identity, so users are only required to sign on once at home organizations. 
 
In the GOLD authentication system, we support a variety of tokens, e.g. X.509 digital 
signature/encryption, SAML assertion. In PERMIS, when authenticating a user the 
AEF could use digital signatures, Kerberos, or username/password pairs [Bacon et al 
2003].  Shibboleth mainly uses the SAML standard to construct its tokens through 
OpenSAML [2005] APIs which is also developed at Internet2 [Internet2/MACE, 
1996-2005] while other tokens are also supported. The standardization that SAML 
offers largely facilitates the exchange of security information about users in trust 
domains and fits nicely with the other WS-* standards utilized in the GOLD system. 
SAML assertions are based on XML format therefore they reinforce the compatibility 
with other standards in the Web service context. The use of X.509 standard in 
constructing a security token is also advocated because of the standardization it offers. 
With X.509 standard, the GOLD participants can easily understand how the identity 
provider vouches for a user and verify the user identity in an appropriate manner. 
 
4.2 Privacy 
Privacy is also an essential issue that a security system needs to address. In the 
Liberty Alliance [2003] approach, a federated network identity delivers the benefit of 
single-sign-on to users by granting rapid access to resources to which they have 
permission, but it does not require the user’s personal information to be stored 
centrally. Thus the user privacy is well protected without unnecessary disclosure. In 
the GOLD system, a user is issued with a SAML assertion, or even a GOLD context 
id in the prototype, and only this assertion or context id flows between the GOLD 
participants. A user is only authenticated once with his private information without 
the need to provide them any additional times.  
 
Privacy protection is not provided in PERMIS. In PERMIS, roles are allocated by 
authorized managers and are held in X.509 attribute certificates. The integrity and 
authenticity of such attribute certificates are protected by their digital signature, so 
they are tamperproof and can be stored anywhere without fear of their being modified 
without detection. The problem with this is that PERMIS has chosen public 
repositories to store the attribute certificates, which compromises the user’s privacy 
[Bacon et al. 2003]. In this case the ADF in PERMIS pulls the attribute certificates 
from LDAP directories and the release of the certificates are controlled neither by the 
users nor by the certificate issuers, i.e. Attribute Authority. On the contrary, in OASIS 
the appointment certificates are not publicly visible when being issued or presented. 
When appointment certificates go through communication channels they are 
encrypted under SSL, therefore the privacy is ensured. In Shibboleth, fairly active 
management of privacy was in place when the system was designed. Morgan et al 
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[2004] indicates the rationale underlying the Shibboleth design. Shibboleth employs 
an attribute-based authorization. They propose that typical user authentication 
methods only provide the application with the permanent user identifier of the person 
who has been authenticated. However the applications need additional information 
about users, i.e. user attributes to make proper authorization decisions. Shibboleth is 
designed specifically to provide user attributes to applications with flexibility, 
extensibility, security and privacy required in federation. In terms of privacy, they 
further suggest that the users should control what personal information is released and 
to whom, and the resource provider should only receive as much user information as 
needed to make access control decisions unless the user chooses to release more. 
Shibboleth places emphasis on the importance of using user attributes in the privacy 
protection, where the user identity is just another attribute that is only sent when the 
resource requires. In this way the system keeps the identity flow to the minimum.  
4.3 Federation and broken style trust 
Federation is an indispensable part in the GOLD architecture and offers the GOLD 
participants freedom of deciding whether they want to trust the identity providers 
based on a pre-determined trust relationship. PERMIS [PERMIS 2001] and OASIS  
[Hine et al 2000] have been developed in a distributed environment. Undoubtedly 
federation is the paramount issue in the Shibboleth system. 
 
However, as the requirement dictated earlier, the GOLD system also offers 
participants a choice of finding alternative independent parties in cases of parties 
disagreeing on the authorities they trust, without sacrificing any traceability or 
accountability of credentials. In such cases, a participant that holds the resource may 
not directly trust the identity provider who vouches for the user through creating 
digital signatures. Instead, a signature validation component associated with the 
participant looks for other trusted certificate authorities who can validate the signature 
of identity provider. This could be going through a hierarchy with a CA chain until 
verification is determined by a trustworthy CA. This structure has a systematic 
management on the credential traceability and accountability aspects. This broker 
style trust is not currently supported in any of other aforementioned tools. 
4.4 Dynamic activation and deactivation of access rights 
Central to the authorization requirements is the need for dynamic activation and 
deactivation of the access rights. As addressed earlier, the GOLD framework supports 
this by enabling VOs to define conceptual boundaries around projects and tasks so 
that the roles and permissions can be scoped. Ongoing decisions can be made along 
with the progresses of projects or tasks in relation to the dynamic activation and 
deactivation of the access rights. A high level of granularity is provided in this 
context. These are all achievable by the advantages of standardization and flexibilities 
that XACML can offer.  
 
XACML is flexible and capable of finely grained access control. This offers a 
solution for GOLD to deal with the dynamicity, heterogeneity, and autonomy of VO. 
Power et al [2005] stress that “some requirements will be nationally or internationally 
mandated, while others will be due to local policies and requirements.” This matches 
the characteristics of the GOLD VOs. Power et al [2005] also have illustrated the 
extensibility, flexibility, full expressive power of XACML.  “The best that one can do 
in such circumstances is to offer a system that is sufficiently flexible to accommodate 
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these different needs.” In GOLD, each organization in the VO is taking care of 
resources held at its own site with its autonomy. These heterogeneous requirements 
need to be coordinated with such a flexible approach.   XACML offers a standardized 
policy language, and also defines a request/response protocol. The protocol defines 
how policy creation, policy request, policy decision processes should conform to 
required structures.  
 
OASIS [Bacon et al. 2003] provides the means for the dynamic role activation. As 
discussed in the earlier section of this paper, in OASIS roles are service specific and 
are activated within sessions. Roles can have activation conditions such that 
requirements for prerequisite roles can be included. Role activations can also include 
constraints on the context and these must be checked during role activation. The 
dynamic role activation in OASIS is well supported by the use of appointment 
certificates as introduced in the earlier section. In contrast, the role and policy rights 
assignment in PERMIS are rather persistent and the attribute certificates PERMIS 
uses are a static representation. According to the PERMIS developers, in the current 
release of PERMIS, a role is revoked by explicitly deleting the role AC from the 
LDAP directory using an LDAP browser/admin tool.  Shibboleth focuses on attribute-
based authorization and it does not mention the dynamic use of policy rights.  
 
4.5 Policy delegation 
Also in GOLD, we aim to support the delegation of authorities, where the source of 
authorities can delegate roles/privileges/rights to the subordinate authorities. X.509 
standard, which PERMIS is based on, specifies mechanisms to control the delegation 
of authority from the source of authority to subordinate attribute authorities, the 
delegation was not fully supported by the PERMIS implementation in the previous 
releases. However it is currently supported by the recently developed release 
according to the developers. A role holder may delegate his/her role to another 
individual, without the need to have permission to alter the privileges assigned to that 
individual. Furthermore PERMIS supports role hierarchies. With role hierarchies 
privileges of subordinate roles can be inherited by superior roles, and a role holder 
can delegate just a subordinate role instead of the entire role [Chadwick D. & Otento 
A., 2002]. OASIS uses appointment as introduced earlier, as opposed to the privilege 
delegation.  
  
Table 1 summarizes the evaluation above on the various tools we have investigated.  
 
 
 PERMIS OASIS Shibboleth Our approach 
Single-sign-on Supported (built-
in in 
authorization 
system) 
N/A Supported Supported  
User privacy Not Supported  N/A Supported with 
active privacy 
management  
Supported (good 
privacy 
maintenance and 
identity control) 
Federation Distributed 
environment 
Distributed 
environment 
Supported  Supported  
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Broker style trust  N/A N/A Not supported Supported 
Variety of tokens Supported in 
authentication 
(digital 
signature, 
kerboros, 
Username/passw
ord) 
N/A Supported 
(mainly use 
SAML) 
Supported 
(X509, SAML 
assertion, etc) 
Standardised 
language 
N/A N/A SAML standards 
based 
SAML standards 
based and use of 
XACML 
Dynamic activation 
and deactivation of 
access rights 
Not supported 
(persistent policy 
rights with the 
use of static 
attribute 
certificates) 
Dynamic role 
activation with the 
use of appointment 
certificates 
N/A 
(attribute-based 
authorization) 
Supported 
Policy delegation Supported in 
current release; 
not in previous 
releases 
Not supported (use 
appointment 
instead) 
N/A Supported  
 
Table 1 – Evaluation of Tools 
 
5 Conclusion 
This paper looked at VO requirements in terms of authorization and authentication 
taking into account the dynamics of a VO, the levels of distrust, the need for 
federation as well as rights delegation. We have evaluated the 4 tools available under 
open source licensing which are addressing similar issues. We use our requirements 
as benchmarks and give practical assessments on what these tools do and how they 
address issues that we are concerned. Since the GOLD project provides an 
infrastructure for virtual organizations, there are practical and specific requirements in 
the due context that we also need to take into account, in achieving a robust 
authentication and authorization framework. This framework needs to offer 
comprehensive but flexible mechanisms to satisfy the need for accountability and 
traceability as well as granularity of access control.     
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